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                               Abstract  
Many moral philosophers have assumed that ordinary folk embrace moral objectivism. But, if so, 
why do folk embrace objectivism? One possibility is the pervasive connection between religion 
and morality in ordinary life. Some theorists contend that God is viewed as a divine guarantor of 
right and wrong, rendering morality universal and absolute. But is belief in God per se sufficient 
for moral objectivism? In this paper, we present original research exploring the connections 
between metaethics and particular conceptions of God among religious participants. Study 1 
shows that, when controlling for religiosity, age, and belief in God’s loving characteristics, it is 
belief in God’s punishing characteristics (specifically, the existence of Hell) that uniquely 
predicts rejection of moral relativism. Study 2 shows that followers of Abrahamic faiths are more 
likely to endorse moral objectivism when thinking of the Divine, regardless of loving or 
punishing characteristics. And Study 3 shows that priming for moral objectivism makes theists 
more likely to endorse God’s punishing characteristics. A general picture is suggested by these 
data. For Abrahamic theists, God’s particular characteristics are not germane to the question of 
whether his moral commandments are real and objective. And while theists strongly endorse 
God’s loving characteristics, focusing on the objective nature of morality can highlight God’s 
punishing nature, reminding theists that objective morality requires a divine guarantor of justice 
to enforce it. 
Keywords​:  Moral psychology, psychology of religion, conceptions of God, religion and 
morality, metaethics. 
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Moral Objectivism and a Punishing God 
 
Nahum 1:2-3 “The Lord is a jealous God, filled with vengeance and wrath...The Lord is 
slow to get angry, but his power is great, and he never lets the guilty go unpunished.” 
 
 ​Exodus 34:6-7 “​The ​LORD​, The ​LORD​ God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and 
abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving inequity, 
transgression and sin.” 
 
Since ancient times, great minds have drawn a connection between morality and the 
divine. For example, in the ​Laws​ (ca.4th century BCE) Plato writes that “the fear of such 
vengeance, exacted by the gods, should hold a man in check” ​(Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997, p. 
1531)​ and that “no one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an 
unholy act or lets any lawless word pass his lips” (p. 1542). Around the same time, the Mohists 
in pre-dynastic China (ca. 5th-4th century BCE) were arguing that “if the ability of ghosts and 
spirits to reward the worthy and punish the wicked could be firmly established as fact throughout 
the empire and among the common people, it would surely bring order to the state and great 
benefit to the people” ​(Ivanhoe & Van Norden, 2005, p. 104)​. This connection continues in 
modern times, as when, in a famous passage from ​The Brothers Karamazov​ (1880), Ivan 
Fyodorovich opines that “​if there is and has been any love on earth up to now, it has come not 
from natural law but solely from people’s belief in their own immortality” ​(Dostoevsky, 1990, p. 
69)​. These thinkers suggest that religious belief is conducive to—perhaps even necessary 
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for—moral or prosocial behavior. And some contemporary psychological research has 
uncovered such a connection ​(Atkinson & Bourrat, 2011; Bourrat, Atkinson, & Dunbar, 2011; D. 
D. P. Johnson, 2005; K. A. Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013; see Saleam & Moustafa, 2016 
for a review; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011; Watts et al., 2015; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016)​. 
But the connection between morality and religious belief can also be drawn at a higher 
level of analysis. Some have maintained, for example, that God not only punishes people for 
disobeying his commands but also instantiates, realizes, or constructs objective morality ​ex 
nihilo​. On this view, in the absence of God, morality ​itself ​(conceived in absolute, law-like 
terms) could not exist. Hobbes gives voice to such a position in ​Leviathan​,​ ​when he writes that 
only principles, “​delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things” are 
“properly called Lawes” ​(Hobbes, 1996, p. 111)​. Nietzsche offers a radically different account 
that also affirms a strong connection between belief in God and belief in objective morality. In 
On the Genealogy of Morality​, he speculates that slaves in the ancient world yearned for revenge 
against their masters, yet were powerless to act. Their frustration generated a compensatory 
belief that a noble God exists, is able to detect the objective evil in their masters, and will 
therefore punish them (even when the slaves themselves could not). The desire for revenge, then, 
generates not only belief in God, but also belief in supernatural punishment as well as the 
existence of objective moral facts ​(e.g. Sinhababu, 2007)​. Freud, too, maintained that people 
create a supernatural “supreme court of justice” to ensure that “all good is rewarded and all evil 
punished” ​(Gay, 1995, p. 696)​.  
In this paper we set out to investigate the connection between morality and religious 
belief at this higher level of analysis—to wit, the connection between belief in God and belief in 
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moral objectivism. Many contemporary philosophers maintain that ordinary folk are objectivists 
about morality ​(e.g. Blackburn, 1998; Brink, 1989; Joyce, 2006; Shafer-Landau, 2003; Smith, 
1994; see Sarkissian, 2016 for a review)​, and some research suggests they might be correct 
(Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 
Heiphetz & Young, 2016; though see Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, & Knobe, 2011 for 
evidence that folk might tacitly embrace relativism)​. While multiple explanations could be 
offered for this, it seems, ​prima facie​, that morality grounded in a theistic conceptual framework 
could help explain why ordinary folk embrace objectivism; after all, when the philosophers 
mentioned above make claims about ‘ordinary folk’, they are primarily referring to individuals 
who believe  in a monotheistic God ​(Hackett, Grim, Stonawski, Skirbekk, & Potančoková, 
2012)​, whose commandments apply absolutely and to everyone, regardless of their contingent 
beliefs or desires ​(Piazza & Landy, 2013)​. So, it might seem only natural for someone who 
believed in God to believe that some moral dictates stem from Divine Command, are objectively 
true, and apply to all people.  
Others have investigated this theistic explanation for folk objectivism. Goodwin and 
Darley (​2008)​ support such an explanation, reporting that how people ​ground ​or ​justify ​their 
moral beliefs can predict whether they are objectivists about morality. In one of their 
experiments, they assessed participants’ commitments to moral objectivism by presenting them 
with a number of cases of moral disagreement, and asking whether they thought it was possible 
for both sides to be correct. Later, they asked participants how they grounded their moral beliefs 
by having them select from several metaethical justifications, including a divine command 
justification. This was followed by another question: “According to you, is it possible for there to 
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be right and wrong acts, without the existence of God?”. They found that participants who 
grounded their moral beliefs in divine command (“they are ordained by a supreme being”) were 
more objective than those who did not. What’s more, if participants answered the last question 
by claiming that there could be no right or wrong without God (or even if they were unsure), 
they were more objectivist still. However, these results failed to replicate in some further 
research ​(e.g. Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013)​.  
More recently, Yilmaz and Bahçekapili ​(2015)​ explored the relationship between 
religious belief and moral objectivism in a more systematic way. In one of their priming studies, 
participants primed with divinity concepts in a scrambled sentence task (such as ​spirit​, ​divine​, 
and ​God​) endorsed moral objectivism and rejected moral relativism to a greater extent than did 
participants in a neutral prime condition. Yet they also found evidence for a causal connection 
running the other way; in a subsequent study, when participants were primed to think of morality 
in subjective terms (by reading a text that contrasted a moral claim with a highly objective 
scientific claim), they evinced lower levels of confidence in their belief in God.  
The studies by Goodwin and Darley suggest a ​correlation​ between belief in God and an 
objectivist conception of morality. Yilmaz and Bahçekapili suggest ​causal ​connections; when 
people think of religious concepts, they are more likely to endorse moral objectivism; 
conversely, when they are primed with moral subjectivism, they show lower levels of religiosity. 
Both of these studies provide support for the theistic explanation of folk objectivism.  
However, a more nuanced possibility is suggested when considering these findings in 
light of other research suggesting that what matters for individual morality is not belief, per se, 
but ​how​ one thinks of God. For example, Shariff and Norenzayan ​(2011)​ found that how 
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participants characterized God predicted their moral behavior. When given a chance to cheat in 
an experimental setting, participants who emphasized punishing aspects of God were less likely 
to do so compared to those who emphasized loving and merciful aspects of God. Similarly, 
Johnson et al. ​(2013)​ found that belief in a punishing God correlated with more aggressive (and 
less forgiving) responses to imagined social transgressions, while Yilmaz and Bahçekapili ​(2015) 
found that priming participants with punishment, whether religious or secular, led to increased 
prosocial intentions. In other research, Shariff and Rhemtulla ​(2012)​ found that, across 67 
countries, belief in Hell was negatively correlated with overall crime rates, whereas belief in 
Heaven was positively correlated with higher crime rates—even when controlling for GDP, 
income inequality, and other predictors of crime. Other findings support the diverging impact of 
endorsing God’s loving as opposed to punishing aspects ​(e.g. Harrell, 2012; Pichon, Boccato, & 
Saroglou, 2007)​.  
How do we make sense of these results? One approach would emphasize relationships 
between conceptualizations of God and views about morality. If belief in moral objectivism is 
correlated with conceiving of God as ‘punishing’ or ‘vengeful’ as opposed to ‘loving’ or 
‘forgiving’, the previous pattern of results begins to make sense. Those who believe in a 
punishing God may be less likely to cheat and also less likely to forgive because they consider 
moral transgressions as objectively wrong.  
To investigate this idea, we conducted three studies. The first shows a correlation 
between believing in a punishing God and rejecting moral relativism. The second and third 
explore the causal connections between these two variables. This investigation is of interest in at 
least two ways. First, it is of theoretical interest because it constitutes a novel investigation into 
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the causal relationship between particular beliefs about God and moral objectivism. Second, it is 
of practical interest because, as noted, the connection between objectivist morality and belief in a 
punishing God could have implications for religious conflict, outgroup religious prosociality, and 
the prospects of tolerance and cosmopolitanism.  
  ​A Note about Agnostics and Atheists: ​In the following studies we investigate a potential 
relationship between belief in moral objectivism and conceptions of God. However, agnostics 
and atheists do not believe in God, and therefore cannot be predicted to conceive of God as 
having loving or punishing characteristics. Thus, for the studies below, we eliminated any 
participants who selected “Atheist/Agnostic/None” in response to the question, “What is your 
religion?” presented in the demographics phase of the following studies. However, for interest 
and transparency, we conducted analyses for atheists and report the single marginally significant 
result (for Study 3) in the Supplementary Materials (SM), along with a post-hoc interpretation of 
this finding. 
We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in the studies below.  
Study 1 
In this initial study, we tested for a correlation between belief in Hell (taken as a proxy for belief 
in a punishing God) and rejection of relativism about morality. 
Method 
Participants. ​Sample size was determined before any data analysis, using G*Power 3.1. 
We took a medium sized effect (.30) as our threshold of interest. A 95% power of detecting such 
an effect required a sample of about 165 participants. We therefore recruited 360 participants 
using Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk service, expecting to eliminate a considerable number of 
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atheists and non-believers from the sample. In total, 356 participants completed the study, 
including 230 self-reported theists. Of these, 41 failed a basic comprehension check, leaving 189 
for the analysis below (110 women; mean age = 40.15, ​SD ​= 11.85, range: 21-81). Of these, 
84.1%  identified some denomination of Christianity as their religious affiliation (see SM for full 
details). Based on our final sample of 189 participants, a 2-tailed test of significance, and an 
alpha level of .05, a sensitivity analysis using G*Power 3.1 indicated an 80% power to detect an 
effect size of .20 in a bivariate correlational analysis. 
Participants were given monetary compensation for their participation at the end of the 
study. 
Materials and Procedure. ​Participants were presented with a 5-item Moral Relativism 
scale in randomized order ​(adapted from Forsyth, 1980 see SM)​, and asked to mark their 
agreement or disagreement with each on a 7-point scale. All relativism scale items were highly 
internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .82), and were averaged to form a relativism score for each 
participant. Participants then answered a number of demographic questions, including the Duke 
University Religiosity (DUREL) scale ​(Koenig & Büssing, 2010)​. The DUREL scale consists of 
5 questions which are subdivided into 3 subscales, measuring 1) organizational religious activity, 
2) non-organizational religious activity , and 3) intrinsic religiosity (see SM). Since we are 
interested in how one’s religious beliefs are related to one’s thoughts about the nature and status 
of morality, we predicted that one’s level of intrinsic religiosity could moderate the relationship 
between the other variables of interest in our studies. Thus, we use this subscale (Cronbach’s α = 
.90) in all analyses. 
Finally, we assessed participants’ endorsements of the loving and punishing aspects of 
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God by asking about their belief in Heaven and Hell on 7 point scales (following the logic of 
Shariff and Rhemtulla, 2012) as part of a final demographics questionnaire. P​articipants were 
then debriefed, and ​given $0.50 for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Results. ​Relativism was negatively correlated with intrinsic religiosity, ​r​(187) = -.21, ​p ​= 
.004, belief in Hell,​ r​(187) = -.21, ​p​ = .003, and belief in Heaven, ​r​(187) = -.15, ​p ​= .034. 
Intrinsic religiosity was highly correlated with both belief in Heaven, ​r​(187) ​= ​.67, ​p​ < .001 and 
belief in Hell, ​r​(187)​ ​= .58, ​p​ < .001. Belief in Hell was negatively correlated with age, ​r​(187)​ ​= 
-.15, ​p​ = .037, suggesting a form of motivated cognition ​(e.g. Mather & Carstensen, 2005)​. 
To further test the significance of these predictors, we performed a multiple regression 
analysis using belief in Heaven, belief in Hell, intrinsic religiosity, and age ​(which has been 
shown to predict objectivism, Beebe & Sackris, 2016)​ as predictor variables, and objectivism as 
the outcome variable. In this complete model, belief in a punishing God emerged as the sole 
significant predictor of rejection of relativism for theists. See Table 1.  
Taking belief in Hell as a proxy for belief in a punishing God, and relativism as the 
reverse of objectivism, this study finds an initial correlation between believing in a punishing 
God and endorsing moral objectivism.  
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Discussion. ​We might now ask: Does belief in a punishing conception of God drive 
theists toward moral objectivism, or does a commitment to moral objectivism make them 
conceive of God in punishing terms? We can see this question as at the heart of a very old debate 
in metaethics, one that harkens back to the discussions of Hobbes and Nietzsche over the relation 
between God and morality. ​However, whereas these previous discussions concerned belief in 
God generally,​ our correlational findings suggest a modification: Perhaps—in the spirit of 
Hobbes—individuals think of morality in objective terms when they conceive of God as an 
infallible, omnipotent punisher. Or perhaps—in the spirit of Nietzsche—they are likely to 
endorse a punishing God to the extent that they affirm moral objectivism. 
Some observations support each of these models. For example, one does not generally 
select one’s initial religious affiliation, but is rather reared in the religion of one’s parents or 
community, where one might be exposed both to a particular conception of God and the 
conception of morality consistent with that God. This would support the Hobbesian model. By 
contrast, many individuals do switch religious affiliations later in life; by one count, 28% of U.S. 
adults forsake the religion they were raised in (e.g. changing from Catholicism to Protestantism 
or atheism), and this number increases to nearly half (44%) of U.S. adults if one considers 
changes within religious traditions (e.g. from Baptist to Methodist) ​(Pew Forum on Religion & 
Public Life, 2008)​. Adults might be gravitating toward religions that portray God as affirming 
their mature moral convictions. This would support the Nietzschean model. Of course, it could 
also be that both of these models contribute to the connection between belief in a punishing God 
and moral objectivism. 
We set out to investigate each of these models in the studies below. 
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Study 2 
In this study, in line with a modified Hobbesian model, we predicted that priming theists with the 
concept of a punishing God would increase their avowals of moral objectivism. 
Method 
Participants. ​Sample size was determined before any data analysis, using G*Power 3.1. 
We took a medium effect (​f​) of .25 as our threshold of interest for the current study, which 
required a total sample size of about 160 theists with an 80% chance of detecting any effect. 
Needing to eliminate atheists from our sample, and expecting to eliminate participants because of 
failure to correctly complete the task or the comprehension check, we decided to collect at least 
500 participants.  
In all, 538 participants were recruited using Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk service. 
Self-reported atheists and agnostics (n = 202) were excluded from the analyses, leaving a sample 
of 336 theists. Fifty-three of these participants failed a comprehension check and were removed 
from the sample, leaving 283 participants. Thirteen of these participants failed to follow the 
instructions for the sentence scramble task correctly and were removed from the sample, leaving 
270 participants. Finally, each author independently coded participants’ responses to three funnel 
questions testing for suspicion of the purpose of the study. Criteria were established through 
discussion of a sub-sample of the cases, and a dichotomous categorization was given to each 
participant, indicating either obliviousness to or awareness of the purpose of the study. Interrater 
reliability was substantial (Kappa = .798, ​p ​< .001), with agreement on 269 of 270 cases.​ ​After 
resolving this disagreement, only two participants were removed for suspecting the purpose of 
the study. In all, 68 theists were excluded from our sample as follows: 14 from Divine-Loving, 6 
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from Divine-Punishing, 16 from Divine-Neutral, 13 from Neutral-Loving, 11 from 
Neutral-Punishing, and 8 from Neutral-Neutral.  
The remaining sample of 268 participants (171 women; mean age = 35, SD = 11.48, 
range: 18-68) were distributed across our six conditions as follows: Divine-Loving = 37, 
Divine-Punishing = 49, Divine-Neutral = 46, Neutral-Loving = 36, Neutral-Punishing = 40, 
Neutral-Neutral = 60. Of these, 74.2% identified some denomination of Christianity as their 
religious affiliation (see SM for full details). Based on our final sample of 268 participants and 
an alpha level of .05, a sensitivity analysis using G*Power 3.1 indicated an 80% power to detect 
an effect size of .19 in an ANOVA. 
Materials and Procedure. ​In this 2 (Divinity: Divine Prime, Neutral Prime) x 3 
(Attitude: Loving Prime, Punishing Prime, Neutral Prime) priming study, we investigated the 
modified Hobbesian model using a sentence scramble prime similar to that used by Yilmaz and 
Bahçekapili (2015, 2016) and originally devised by Shariff and Norenzayan ​(2007)​. Participants 
were given ten groups of five words each and were required to discard one and form a 
meaningful, four-word sentence. Those in the Divine conditions had to include words intended to 
prime concepts related to the divine (​spirit, divine, God,​ and ​sacred​) for four of these word 
groups, and those in the Loving ( (​love, forgave, peacefully, ​and ​kind​) and Punishing ((​harsh​, 
punishing, angry​, and ​revenge​) conditions were similarly primed​. ​Thus, participants in 
Divine-Loving and Divine-Punishing conditions unscrambled two neutral sentences and eight 
sentences containing prime words, four related to divinity and four related to loving or punishing 
respectively. Participants in Neutral-Loving, Neutral-Punishing, or Divine-Neutral conditions 
unscrambled six neutral sentences, and four sentences containing prime words related to loving, 
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punishing, or the divine, respectively.  And participants in the Control condition unscrambled 
neutral sentences containing no prime words. See SM for further details. 
After the priming task, participants completed a three-item moral objectivism 
questionnaire. In Study 1, we took relativism as the reverse of objectivism (from a folk 
psychological perspective) and, on that basis, interpreted our findings as supporting our primary 
thesis—namely, that belief in a punishing God is correlated with belief in moral objectivism (for 
theists). Here, we test for objectivism directly with the following new 3-item scale: 
1. There exists a single moral code that is applicable to everyone, regardless of any 
individual person’s beliefs or cultural identity. 
2. If two people really disagree about a particular moral problem then at most one of them 
can be correct, since moral problems cannot have multiple correct answers. 
3. It is possible to compare different cultures by a single, universal standard of moral 
rightness.  
Responses to the three items were highly internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .81) and they 
were averaged to form a single objectivism measure. ​Not only did this 3-item scale differ from 
the measure used in Study 1 by testing objectivism directly (as opposed to testing for rejection of 
relativism), it was also not based on previous measures. We were concerned that existing 
measures, such as the 5-item scale adapted from Forsyth ​(1980)​, did not capture metaethical 
views in a precise way, potentially limiting what we can infer from their use in this context. (See 
SM for further discussion.)  
After completing our objectivism measure, each participant answered a series of three 
funnel questions intended to assess suspicion of the purpose of the study. Finally, participants 
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completed a short demographic survey, including the DUREL intrinsic religiosity items 
(Cronbach’s α = .92), which were averaged to a single intrinsic religiosity measure. ​Participants 
were then debriefed and ​given $1 for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (Divinity) x 3 (Attitude) ANOVA was used to compare the influence that priming 
divinity and dispositional attitude had on endorsement of objectivism for the theists. There was 
no significant effect for Divinity ​F​(1, 266) = 1.80, ​p​ = .181, ​ηp​² = .007, or Attitude, ​F​(2, 265) = 
0.13, ​p​ = .876, ​ηp​² = .001. Nor was there an​ interaction effect, ​F​(2, 265) = 0.15, ​p​ = .862, ​ηp​² = 
.001. See SM for means and SDs by condition.  
We did not find an effect in Study 2 supporting the modified Hobbesian explanation of 
the correlation between belief in a punishing God and metaethical objectivism. This might 
suggest that our methodology for priming concepts related to a punishing God did not work, 
especially when considering that Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2015) found a medium-large effect for 
Divinity on objectivism in their second study, using a similar design. However, a closer 
examination of our results supports a different hypothesis.  
First, whereas our sample consisted of 74% Christians (with no single denomination 
comprising more than 20%), 90% of the theists in Yilmaz and Bahçekapili’s sample reported 
identification with Islam. . One possible explanation for the disparity between our result and 
theirs may be that Muslims, or followers of Abrahamic religions in general, are more susceptible 
to the religious primes. While our sample comprised only a small number of Muslims, we 
decided to test this hypothesis by focusing on self-reported followers of Abrahamic religions: 
Protestants, Catholics, Evangelicals, Other Christians, Jews, and Muslims (n = 209). Indeed, an 
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ANOVA uncovered a main effect of Divinity on levels of objectivism for this group, ​F​(1, 207) = 
4.02, ​p​ = .046, ​ηp​² = .019. (See Figure 1.) ​Abrahamics ​primed with divinity concepts indicated 
higher levels of agreement (​M​ = 4.11, ​SD ​= 1.59) with our objectivist statements than those in 
non-religious, neutral conditions (​M​ = 3.68, ​SD ​= 1.43​)​.  No other significant main or interaction 1
effects were found for Abrahamics, nor were any significant main or interaction effects found for 
non-Abrahamic theists (n = 59).  
Our primary aim with this study was to test our modified Hobbesian model, the 
hypothesis that thinking of a punishing God influences one to adopt more objectivist metaethical 
beliefs. We did not find clear evidence for this hypothesis. However, we did find that priming 
members of Abrahamic traditions with concepts of the divine made them significantly more 
inclined to endorse metaethical objectivism. This suggests that our Divinity primes were 
successful. However, we also want to air a note of caution regarding these results, as 
controversies have arisen for priming studies ​(e.g. Cesario, 2014; cf. Willard, Shariff, & 
Norenzayan, 2016)​, as well as for statistical methods that isolate and test for predicted effects in 
subpopulations ​(e.g. Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011)​. We thus regard the results as 
provisional, even though their outlook may be somewhat strengthened by their concordance with 
the similar findings of Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2015). 
Study 3 
Here, in line with the Nietzschean model outlined above, we predicted that priming theists with 
moral objectivism would increase their endorsements of the concept of a punishing God. 
Method 
1 ​Abrahamic Faith was examined as a moderator of the relation between Divinity and Objectivism using the Process 
Macro. The interaction term between Divinity and Abrahamic Faith just missed the significance threshold,  Δ​R​2​ = 
.012, ​F​(1, 267) = 3.39, ​p​ = .067. 
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Participants. ​Sample size was determined before any data analysis, using G*Power 3.1. 
We again took a medium effect (​f​) of .25 as our threshold of interest, which required a total 
sample size of about 150 theists with an 80% chance of detecting any effect. As with the studies 
above, we expected to eliminate a large number of atheists from our sample. Thus, we set out to 
collect at least 360 participants.  
In all, 365 participants (162 female) completed an online questionnaire, including 198 
theists. Of these, 12 failed a basic comprehension check at the beginning (7 in the absolute 
condition, 2 in the relative condition, and 3 in the control condition), and another 18 were 
removed for failing a manipulation check after the prime (8 from the absolute condition, 10 from 
the relative condition) leaving 168. Finally, each author independently coded participants’ 
responses to three funnel questions testing for suspicion of the purpose of the study, with 
agreement on 166 of 168 cases (Kappa = .661, ​p ​< .001), and 3 additional participants were 
eliminated for suspecting the purpose of the study, all from the Relative condition. This left 165 
for the analyses below (82 women; mean age = 34.80, ​SD​ = 12.69, range: 19-73), distributed 
across conditions as follows: 50 in objective, 51 in relative, and 64 in control. Detailed religious 
affiliation information can be found in the Supplementary Materials (SM), however, 80% of 
participants identified some denomination of Christianity as their religious affiliation. Based on 
our final sample of 165 participants and an alpha level of .05, a sensitivity analysis using 
G*Power 3.1 indicated an 80% power to detect an effect size of .24 in a one-way ANOVA. 
Materials and Procedure. ​In order to induce participants to think of morality as either 
absolute on the one hand, or relative on the other, they were randomly assigned to one of three 
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conditions ​(modified from Young & Durwin, 2013)​. Those in the Relativism condition received 
the following prompt: 
 
Many thoughtful, reflective people maintain that moral rightness and wrongness are 
relative--that they are determined solely by one’s background or cultural upbringing. In 
other words, there are no universal moral truths.  
 
Do you agree that moral rightness and wrongness are relative, that they are determined by 
one’s background or cultural upbringing? 
 
Those in the Objectivism condition received this prompt: 
 
Many thoughtful, reflective people maintain that moral rightness and wrongness are 
universal--that they are independent of one’s background or cultural upbringing. In other 
words, there are universal moral truths. 
 
Do you agree that moral rightness and wrongness are universal, that they are independent 
of one’s background or cultural upbringing? 
 
Those in the Control condition received this prompt: 
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Many people agree that online studies have proven beneficial, as they speed up the 
process of data collection and allow participants to take part in the studies easily and 
from a variety of venues.  
 
Do you agree that online studies are beneficial for researchers and participants? 
 
Participants marked their agreement on a 7-item agreement scale. (Their answers were ignored in 
the analyses.)  
Next, subjects were provided with a 14-item conceptions of God scale​(Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2011 see SM)​, asking to what extent they endorsed God’s loving characteristics 
(e.g. ‘forgiving’, ‘compassionate’) or punishing characteristics (e.g. ‘fearsome’, ‘vengeful’). All 
Loving God items loaded on Factor 1, and all Punishing God items loaded on factor 2. There 
were no cross loadings. The ‘Loving God’ items (Cronbach’s α = .92) were averaged into a 
single Loving God scale, and the ‘Punishing God’ items (Cronbach’s α = .90) were averaged into 
a single Punishing God scale. This was followed by a series of funnel questions to assess their 
awareness of the purpose of the metaethics questions. Finally, they provided demographic 
information, including the 3-item DUREL intrinsic religiosity scale (Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Participants were then debriefed and ​given $1 for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
A one way, multivariate ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the manipulation for 
ratings of Loving God and Punishing God in the objectivist, relativist, and control conditions. 
There was no significant effect of condition on theists’ conception of god as a loving being, 
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F​(2,162) = 1.55, ​p​ = .216, ​ηp​2 ​= .019. However, there was a significant effect of condition on 
theists’ conception of god as a punishing being, ​F​(2,162) = 6.09, ​p ​= .003, ​ηp​2 ​= .070. (See 
Figure 2.) Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey test indicated that the mean score for Punishing 
God in the Objective condition (​M ​= 3.75, ​SD ​= 1.41) was significantly higher than both the 
Control condition (​M ​= 2.85, ​SD ​= 1.31, ​p ​= .002, Cohen’s ​d ​= .67) and the Relative condition 
(​M ​= 3.09, ​SD ​= 1.49, ​p​ = .047, Cohen’s ​d ​= .46). The Relative condition did not significantly 
differ from the Control condition (​p ​= .634, Cohen’s ​d ​= .17).  
As in study 2, we also ran an analysis focusing only on those in the Abrahamic tradition 
(n = 141). We discovered the same pattern with a larger effect size, ​F​(2,138) = 6.94, ​p​ = .001, 
ηp​2​ ​= .091.  Once again, post hoc comparisons using the Tukey test indicated that the mean score 2
for Punishing God in the Objective condition (​M​ = 3.94, ​SD​ = 1.28) was significantly higher than 
both the Control condition (​M​ = 2.98, ​SD​ = 1.27, ​p​ = .002, Cohen’s ​d​ = .76) and the Relative 
condition (​M​ = 3.12, ​SD​ = 1.49, ​p​ = .015, Cohen’s ​d​ = .60). The Relative condition did not 
significantly differ from the Control condition (​p​ = .870, Cohen’s ​d​ = .11). 
In this study we investigated the causal connection suggested by the tradition of thought 
associated with Nietzsche and Freud--namely, that one’s views about morality shape one’s 
religious views (and not the other way around). As that view might predict, being primed to think 
of morality as objective makes theists think of God as more punishing.  
General Discussion 
In Study 1, we found that, even though belief in moral objectivism correlated with 
intrinsic religiosity, belief in a Loving God (as measured by belief in Heaven), and belief in a 
2 ​Abrahamic Faith was examined as a moderator of the relation between Condition and Objectivism using the 
Process Macro. The interaction term was not significant,  Δ​R​2​ = .001, ​F​(2,162) = .23, ​p​ = .630. 
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Punishing God (as measured by belief in Hell), only the latter uniquely predicted objectivism. So 
we decided to further investigate the causal relationship between these variables. 
It may seem initially more likely that a causal connection runs from belief in God to 
moral objectivism, and we do find provisional evidence for such a connection. In Study 2, 
prompting Abrahamic theists to think of God (whether in loving, punishing, or neutral terms) had 
a small but significant effect on their views concerning morality, making them more likely to 
endorse objectivism. This coheres with the findings of Yilmaz and Bahçekapili provocatively 
titled paper, ​“Without God, everything is permitted?”​ ​(2015)​. However, it may be most accurate 
to conclude that ​for followers of Abrahamic religions​, without God, everything is permitted. 
Future research might target individuals from other religious traditions to further explore this 
relationship. We note that Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016) found punishing primes (whether 
religious or secular) increased prosociality, whereas religious primes alone did not. Our findings 
here raise the possibility that one’s prosocial tendencies are responsive to different primes than 
one’s metaethical perspectives. Future research might compare these two dimensions of the 
moral landscape explicitly.  
In Study 3, we tested the Nietzschean model, whereby one’s metaethical commitments 
shape how one conceives of God. We found that being prompted to think of morality in an 
objectivist fashion strengthened theists’ conception of God as a divine punisher, but had no 
effect on their conception of God as a loving being, which were uniformly high across 
conditions. Indeed, it is possible that ratings of loving God were at ceiling. Across conditions, 
the ​SD​ for loving God was 1.02, compared to 1.44 for punishing God. This suggests that theists 
may invariably conceive of God as loving, forgiving, and merciful, but recognize God’s 
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punishing nature when prompted to think that there are objectively right and wrong answers to 
moral questions. Indeed, the most salient connection between morality and God lies in 
prohibitions which emphasize God’s restriction of behavior; all but one of the Ten 
Commandments, for example, consist in prohibitions (‘thou shalt not kill; bear false witness; 
steal; commit adultery’, etc.) that imply punishments if violated.  
The causal story from study 3 is in line with other studies suggesting a link between an 
individual’s values and ideals on the one hand, and how they conceive of the divine on the other. 
For example, Ross et al ​(2012)​ found that American Christians project their own moral ideals 
onto the figure of Jesus, and take issues important to their own ideological orientations 
(fellowship and caring for liberals, moral teaching for conservatives) to be central to Christianity. 
So Christians tend to think Jesus must be like them. Our findings suggest, similarly, that theists 
tend to modify their conceptions of God based on their beliefs about the nature of morality.  
One way to explain this result is to note that moral education may occur at an earlier age 
(and independently of) one’s religious education, especially as the latter pertains to the attributes 
of God. There is also some evidence that one’s metaethical views are correlated with one’s basic 
personality traits ​(Feltz & Cokely, 2008)​. This suggests that how one conceives of the nature of 
morality (for example, whether diverging moralities could be equally valid) comes first, and later 
renders some characteristics of God more salient or attractive than others. In fact, this may partly 
explain the previously noted finding that people often change their religious affiliation in 
adulthood ​(Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008)​.  
A general picture is suggested by these data, then. For Abrahamic theists, God’s 
particular characteristics are not germane to the question of whether his moral commandments 
MORAL OBJECTIVISM AND A PUNISHING GOD 23 
are real and objective. His divine and univocal rule is sufficient for objective moral command, 
and even while God punishes immoral behavior, his commandments are issued out of care for his 
believers. And whereas theists in general strongly endorse God’s loving characteristics, focusing 
on the objective nature of morality can highlight God’s punishing characteristics, reminding 
theists that objective morality requires a divine guarantor of justice to enforce it.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Multiple linear regression on theists, predicting relativism (Study 1) 
 
Predictor b SE Beta t sr​2 p 
Belief in Hell -.14 .07 -.23 -2.08 -.15 .039 
Belief in Heaven .07 .08 .10 .88 .06 .382 
Intrinsic Religiosity -.13 .11 -.14 -1.36 -.10 .176 
Age -.01 .01 -.11 -1.54 -.11 .125 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1.​ ​Mean Objectivist Responses for Divine and Neutral Prime. Error bars show Standard 
Error of the Mean. 
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Fig. 2.​ ​Means for LovingGod and PunishingGod by Condition. Errors bars show Standard Error 
of the Mean. 
 
